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There is consensus in the economic literature that reserve requirements are a tax levied upon
financial intermediation, yet the incidence of the tax remains controversial. In this paper, we
test whether changes in reserve requirements in Brazil impact the stock returns of the Brazilian
financial system distinctly from the rest of the economy. We show that Brazilian bank stock
returns may have been affected by changes in reserve requirements on both time deposits and
transaction accounts, which implies that the tax burden of required reserves has not been fully
passed through to banks’ borrowers or clients. Stock returns of non-financial firms may also
have been affected by changes in reserve requirements, suggesting that in some cases reserve
requirements on time deposits and transaction accounts served as a non-neutral instrument of
monetary or fiscal policy in Brazil.
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I. Introduction
Reserve requirements serve a number of purposes. Policymakers have extensively
called upon their role as a monetary policy instrument to justify higher ratios or
higher incidence, relying on theoretical arguments that reserve requirements may
help stabilize the demand for money (Hardy 1997), prices (Siegel 1981), the demand
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for goods (Bental and Eden 2002), or the output gap under certain types of shocks
to the economy (Baltensperger 1982). Several other papers dispute this stabilizing
function, especially when monetary policy does not target monetary aggregates.
However, policymakers around the world, particularly in economies lacking fully
fledged securities’ markets, still see them as a feasible alternative to stabilize inflation
or output.
Reserve requirements may also contribute to prudential regulation. Bris and
Cantale (2003) show that positive reserve requirement ratios help restore market
efficiency when there are external agency problems, i.e., when banks have incentives
to take excessive risks but credit risk cannot be directly observed by regulators. In
contrast, reductions in reserve requirements may help restore the efficient
equilibrium in circumstances where banks have incentives to take insufficient
risks, regulators cannot observe credit risk and bank owners cannot perfectly
assess managers’ efforts.
Some authors advocate that the driving motive for the introduction of reserve
requirements was in fact their fiscal role (De Kock et. al. 1964, and Goodfriend and
Hargraves 1983, for the United States). In the Brazilian case, Fernandes (1992)
mentions a number of occasions when fiscal concerns affected reserve requirement
decisions. Whether this is true for other countries is still an open question, but
reserve requirements have certainly been an important source of revenues for
governments throughout the world. In Brazil, if the government were to invest the
balance of non-interest bearing reserve deposits at the central bank at a benchmark
reference rate, interest accrued to these deposits would roughly account for 1% of
federal government monthly revenues, as of 2007, peaking at 7% in November
1998 (Figure 1). Furthermore, the Central Bank of Brazil has incurred a much lower
cost to maintain required bank reserves than if it were to issue ordinary debt
(Table 1).
Reserve requirements are a tax on financial intermediation when interest accrued
to required reserves deposited at the central bank is lower than the rates of return
on alternative bank investment. Although the question “who pays the tax?” is of
relevance to any study of economic distortions or fair income allocation, the
literature has not yet reached an agreement on the answer. Black (1975) and Fabozzi
and Thurston (1986) argue that the incidence of the tax falls entirely on depositors.
Fama (1975) and James (1987), on the other hand, do not find any relation between
reserve requirement ratios and interest rates paid on bank deposits in the United
States. Fama thus infers that the tax is entirely transferred to borrowers, and James
finds empirical evidence to support Fama’s argument.63 THE INCIDENCE OF RESERVE REQUIREMENTS IN BRAZIL
Figure 1. Potential revenue from interest accrued on monthly reserve
deposits at the Central Bank of Brazil (as a share of total revenues actually













































































































































































Table 1. Financial cost of reserve requirements on transaction accounts
(% per year)
Interest accrued on reserve  Interest accrued on
requirements (excludes non-bearing total reserve Overnight Selic
interest bank reserves  requirements rate
on transaction accounts)
Dec.00 7.36 3.60 16.19
Dec.01 8.13 4.26 19.05
Dec.02 10.82 7.48 23.03
Dec.03 8.42 6.02 16.91
Dec.04  8.98  6.32 17.50
Dec.05 8.98 6.22 18.24
Dec.06 8.01 5.56 13.19
Sep.07 6.52 4.68 11.22
Source: Central Bank of Brazil. JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS 64
More recently, the literature has been focusing on the possibility that the tax
burden of reserve requirements be mutually shared by depositors, borrowers and
banks’ shareholders. On theoretical grounds, Davis and Toma (1995) find that
borrowers and shareholders may share the burden of reserve requirements
altogether in a framework where banks have comparative advantage in monitoring
loans and assessing the risk of potential borrowers. On empirical grounds, Kolari
et al. (1988), Slovin et al. (1990), Osborne and Zaher (1992), Cosimano and McDonald
(1998), and Hein and Stewart (2002, 2004) all find evidence supporting the argument
of shared incidence in the United States.
The literature on the Brazilian case has focused on the question of whether
reserve requirements affect the interest spreads on loans advanced by banks to
their clients. If they do, as is the case in Cardoso (2003), the literature concludes
that the tax burden of reserve requirements is passed through to borrowers. A
number of studies produced by Central Bank of Brazil’s staff have in fact assumed
that the incidence of the tax falls entirely on borrowers.1
Cardoso and Koyama (1999) argue that default ratios and operational costs are
the main determinants of bank spreads in Brazil, and show that the ratios of reserve
requirement on time deposits matter little to bank interest spreads because required
reserves on time deposits accrue interest at the central bank. They thus infer that
the tax burden is not passed through to borrowers.
To take a more straightforward stance on the issue of who really pays the tax
implied by reserve requirements in Brazil, this paper follows the recent trend of the
international literature that investigates the incidence of reserve requirements by
employing event study methods to the Brazilian case. What we do in the paper is
test whether banks’ shareholders bear part of the burden of reserve requirements
in Brazil, and, likewise, benefit from reductions in required reserve ratios or
calculation base. We also investigate whether the response of stock returns of
Brazilian banks is in any way different from stock returns from the non-financial
sector.
Reserve requirements in Brazil equal more than a quarter of their respective
deposits and the regulation on reserve requirements is also very cumbersome. Tax
ratios, interest accrued on reserves, form of compliance (cash, securities or vault
1 Every year, the Central Bank of Brazil publishes a report on the evolution, determinants, and
future prospects of banking spreads in Brazil (www.bcb.gov.br). In Juros e Spread Bancário:
Avaliação do Segundo Ano do Projeto, p. 51, the Central Bank of Brazil assumes that the tax
burden of time deposits is zero because their reserves at the central bank accrue the overnight
reference interest rate.65 THE INCIDENCE OF RESERVE REQUIREMENTS IN BRAZIL
cash), and authorized deductions from the reservable base all differ across types
of banks’ liabilities and assets, and have changed remarkably often over the past
12 years.
The Brazilian sample is also very challenging. In addition to a reduced number
of companies listed in the stock market compared to the US, the impressive number
of changes in reserve requirement regulation during these past 12 years makes the
work of any econometrician very hard, and using data prior to the Real Plan poses
another challenge to empirical investigations because of the distortions caused
by hyperinflation. A careful sample selection provided us with three events of
changes in reserve requirements on transactions accounts and four events of
changes in requirements on time deposits. It is not an easy task to reach an
agreement on whether the net effect of some changes was a reduction or an increase
in the tax burden. The last event of change in reserve requirements on transaction
accounts that is analyzed here, for instance, refers both to an increase in the
reserve requirement ratio and to an increase in authorized deductions on the taxable
base, the latter functioning as a reduction in the ratio. Because of this difficulty in
determining whether a change in reserve requirement would be perceived as positive,
neutral or negative for stockholders, we decided to analyze each event separately
and try to draw general conclusions from the individual results we were able to
achieve.
The results were sensitive to alternative test methodologies employed. Under
reasonable assumptions, we find evidence that some changes in reserve
requirements on time and transaction accounts had important effects on the stock
returns of the banking system. Non-financial corporations were most likely affected
only by decisions on reserve requirements on time deposits. These results suggest
that the tax implied by reserve requirements in Brazil is shared amongst banks’
clients and owners, and it is sometimes born by owners alone. Thus, the widespread
perception that reserve requirements on time deposits imply zero costs to banks
and that reserve requirements on transaction accounts are always an efficient
instrument of monetary policy cannot find much support from the results obtained
here.
The paper is presented in the following sequence. Section II provides some
stylized facts on reserve requirements in Brazil. Section III discusses the event
study methods employed in this paper to test for abnormal returns. Section IV
describes the sample. Section V reports the results. Finally, Section VI concludes
the paper. JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS 66
II. Reserve requirements in Brazil2
A. History
Fernandes (1992) reports that reserve requirements in Brazil were first introduced
in 1932. By then the central bank had not yet been created, and the monetary
authority operations were carried out by Banco do Brasil, a state-owned commercial
cum development bank.
Throughout the entire history of reserve requirement regulation in Brazil,
concerns other than those attached strictly to monetary policy permeated reserve
requirement decisions. Cardoso (2003, p. 8) argues that until 1993, reserve
requirements were mainly implemented to (imperfectly) tax bank profits that accrued
with high inflation rates. Fernandes (1992) suggests that other fiscal issues have
also been a determinant of reserve requirement decisions.
In 1945, as an attempt to part the monetary authority from Banco do Brasil, the
agency Superintendência da Moeda e do Crédito (SUMOC) was created to control
money market operations and to set the grounds for a Brazilian central bank. One
of the measures SUMOC implemented was to introduce interest-bearing required
reserves, partly complied with required investment in public bonds. It was then
that the Brazilian monetary authority started to use reserve requirements to sustain
an artificial demand for public securities, a policy that still prevails nowadays
(Figure 2).
SUMOC was not operationally independent from Banco do Brasil, as commercial
banks were required to hold their reserves at the federal commercial bank. As a
result, reserve requirements also functioned as an alternative funding for Banco
do Brasil to implement credit operations on behalf of the central government.
Upon inflationary concerns, the Central Bank of Brazil was created in 1964. Since
then reserve requirement regulation has been successively altered in accordance
with prevailing economic policy purposes. In 1986, federal government deposits
were finally transferred to the Central Bank of Brazil, with the central bank not
allowed to finance National Treasury’s overdraft positions. Therefore, central bank’s
autonomy enhanced.
Until 1993, reserve requirements were used for distributional purposes, with
required ratios being higher for bank branches located in richer regions of the
country (Table 2). Required ratios on transaction accounts increased over time.
2 This section is strongly based on Fernandes (1992) and Cardoso (2003).67 THE INCIDENCE OF RESERVE REQUIREMENTS IN BRAZIL
For non-poor regions, the ratios were 27% from 1969 to 1975, 33% and 35% in 1976,
and 40% from 1977 to 1993. In spite of a long-lasting period of hyperinflation in
Brazil, reserve requirements were not a focal instrument of monetary policy during
this period.3
In 1994, the perverse inflationary dynamics finally came to a halt with the
successful implementation of the Real Plan. Along with a monetary reform also
came a brief fiscal adjustment, the use of the exchange rate as a nominal anchor,
and tight monetary policy.4 From 1994 until the end of 1998, the Central Bank of
Brazil adopted rediscount rates as its main monetary policy instrument, but kept
very close attention to monetary aggregates.
Reserve requirements were intensely used for monetary policy purposes during
the Real Plan. In mid-1994, the central bank increased required ratios on transaction
accounts to 100% (from 40%), on savings accounts to 20% (from 15%), and on time
deposits to 20% (from 0%). In the 18 months following June 1994, there were
53 changes of all sorts in the reserve requirement regulation.  Furthermore, in
this specific period, the central bank, attempting to curb the ability of banks
Figure 2. Composition of required reserves at the Central Bank of Brazil
3 Cardoso (2003). Required ratios on time deposits were in place only in part of the 1984-1985
period.










































































































































































































































Compliance with public securities Interest accruing Non-interest accruing JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS 68
                                               Demand Deposits1/                          Time Deposits
Region A 2/ Region B 2/ Region A 2/ Region B 2/
Apr-69  27 18 9 4.5
May-713/ 27 18 9 4
Jan-73  27 18 0 0
Mar-734/ 27 18 0 0
Jul-735/ 27 18 0 0
Jul-746/ 27 18 0 0
Feb-757/ 27 18 0 0
Jul-758/ 27 18 0 0
Apr-76  33 18 0 0
Jul-76  35 18 0 0
Oct-77  40 18 0 0
Jul-799/ 40 18 0 0
Dec-84  40 18 22 22
Jun-85 40 18 20 20
Jan-92  40 18 0 0
Nov-93  40 40 0 0
Notes: 
1/ 
The periods and formula for calculating average deposits on which required reserves
were to be based changed many times between 1969 and 1993. 
2/ 
 Region B: Acre, Amazonas,
Pará, Maranhão, Piauí, Ceará, Rio Grande do Norte, Paraíba, Pernambuco, Alagoas, Sergipe,
Bahia, Espírito Santo, Goiás, Mato Grosso. Region A: All other states. 
3/
 A reduction of half
percentage point in required reserves will make up resources from demand deposits destined
to loans to small and medium enterprises. 
4/ 
A reduction of 2 percentage points in required
reserves rates will make up resources from demand deposits to be destined to loans to export-
ers.
 5/ 
Percentage of demand deposits destined for rural credit increased from 10% to 15%.
 6/ Amount to be destined to loans to small and medium enterprises increases to 4% of demand
deposits. 
7/
 Mandatory loans for working capital of small and medium enterprises increases to
8% of demand deposits. 8/ 55% of required reserves to be held in government bonds (LTN or
ORTN). 9/ Percentage of demand deposits destined for rural credit increased from 15% to
17%. Source: Cardoso (2003).
Table 2. Reserve requirements in Brazil (% of deposits), 1969 – 1993
to innovate on their funding and thus to bypass reserve requirements, created
new requirements on a number of banks’ assets and liabilities, in addition to the
already existing requirements on investment funds, savings accounts, transaction
accounts, judicial deposits and deposits from realized guarantees (recursos de
depósitos e garantias realizadas).5
Even when monetary policy purposes prevailed in reserve requirement
decisions, fiscal issues were still important. The high level of domestic real interest
rates and the sharp appreciation of the Real during the 1994-1998 period resulted in
5 The accounts that started to be subject to reserve requirements were “contratos de assunção
de obrigações”, credit operations (operações de adiantamento, empréstimos, financiamento e
de crédito), “operações ativas e passivas”, and time deposits at indetermined tenure (depósitos
a prazo de reaplicação automática).69 THE INCIDENCE OF RESERVE REQUIREMENTS IN BRAZIL
increased external borrowing. External inflows were partly sterilized to avoid
pressure on domestic liquidity and interest rates. These countervailing measures,
associated with high debt servicing rates, exerted strong pressure on the fiscal
accounts. In 1998, a year of intense capital flight and increased difficulties to roll
over the domestic debt, reserve requirements were overtly used to sustain an
artificial demand for public securities.
The international confidence crisis of 1997 and 1998 and increased concerns
about debt sustainability led to strong capital outflows, culminating in the floating
of the exchange rate in January 1999. A new policy framework was then envisaged
to keep inflation under control without further compromising the fiscal accounts.
In May 1999, the central bank abandoned the use of rediscount rates as its
operational target to focus on overnight interest rates. In June 1999, the country
formally adopted an inflation-targeting regime, in which reserve requirements lost
some of their importance as a monetary policy instrument.
However, fiscal concerns have still played a role in reserve requirement
decisions, even under an inflation targeting regime. Upon the implementation of
the new monetary policy regime, the central bank committed itself to gradually
reduce reserve requirement ratios “as long as good fiscal results continue and
inflation is under control”.6 However, the easing path of reserve requirements on
transaction accounts did not last long. In 2002, the central bank inaugurated an
additional requirement: interest-bearing reserve requirements on transaction
accounts and time deposits and savings accounts. The purpose was to reduce some
of the pressure on the liquidity that was freed to the market because of an innovation
in instruments used to rollover domestic debt indexed to foreign currency. 7 The
liquidity freed to the market had to be channeled out to daily repo operations with
the central bank or the pressure would be too strong on interest rates and thus on
inflation. This placed the central bank at a very uncomfortable position of rolling
over high amounts of very short term debt. In 2002, this excess liquidity reached
R$ 70 billion and as of November 2006 (date for the last revision in this paper)
stood at R$ 80 billion, of which 28% was withdrawn with very short term repo
operations and 47% with repos redeeming in 5 months.
6 Juros e Spread Bancário, primeiro ano.
7 As an attempt to improve on the supply of financial hedge to the volatility of the exchange
rate, and because of constraints on the issuance of domestic-debt indexed to foreign currencies,
the government decided to rollover maturing domestic-debt indexed to foreign currencies using
derivatives, which had some monetary impact. JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS 70
In February 2003, the required ratio on transaction accounts increased as part
of a set of measures to control accelerating inflation. In this event, the Monetary
Policy Committee made it explicit that the central bank was changing reserve
requirements for monetary policy purposes. After inflationary pressures dissipated,
reserve requirement ratios reduced.
B. A brief international comparison
García (1995) reports that, contrary to Brazil, advanced economies have followed a
trend of reducing reserve requirements over time. This trend has arisen from the
widespread adoption of interest rates, rather than monetary aggregates, as the
main instrument of monetary policy.
In Brazil, even after the explicit adoption of interest rates as the main monetary
policy instrument, and despite the fact that reserve requirements have not been used
as policy instruments since 2003, their phasing out has been hindered by the
entanglements of fiscal and monetary policy. For one thing, the banking credit market
is still not deep enough to absorb the liquidity that would be freed to the market
should required reserves be strongly reduced. In addition, as of September 2007,
around 23% of total reserve requirements were complied with mandatory investment
in public securities (Figure 2), which guarantees an artificial demand of R$ 44 billion
for government debt, or 4% of federal government bonds in the market.
In September 2007, the requirements that remained in Brazil were on transactions
accounts (40% in cash-in-vault plus 5% in non-interest bearing reserves at the
central bank plus 8% interest-bearing reserves at the central bank), time deposits
(15% in the form of mandatory investment in public securities plus 8% in
interestbearing reserves at the central bank), and savings accounts (30% in the
form of both mandatory investment in public securities and interest-bearing reserves
at the central bank plus 65% in required concession of loans). The share of required
reserves on transaction accounts that accrue interest yield the Selic rate (reference
overnight rate), and so do required reserves on time deposits and additional
reserves on savings accounts. At end-2006, interest paid to required reserves on
savings accounts (excluding the additional requirement that yields the Selic rate)
was 6.7% per year plus Taxa Referencial (TR, another base rate set by the Central
Bank) for some types of savings accounts (poupança livre, pecúlio and rural)
and TR plus 3% per year for another type (poupança vinculada).
Compared to the United States, reserve requirements in Brazil bring about an
additional difficulty to depository institutions: the relatively high frequency of
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53%
13% 12% 11%
9% 9% 7% 6% 5% 3%
























































































































website for reserve requirement regulation from January 2004 to December 2006
returns a record of a dozen changes of all sorts – although not all of them meant
increases in requirements. For the past twenty years in Brazil, the number of changes
in reserve ratios, calculation and maintenance periods, exemption base, required
daily balances as a share of total requirement, and reporting procedures has been
substantial. In the United States, the most frequent changes usually occur once a
year, and refer to the bounds on the volume of net transaction accounts over
which distinct reserve ratios apply. Nonetheless, the market is not caught by
surprise upon these changes, as the yearly changes were envisaged by the
Monetary Control Act of 1980 and the Garn-St Germain Act of 1982. For
requirements other than net transaction accounts, no changes have occurred for
the past 16 years.
One could argue that the reason why there have been so many changes in
reserve requirement regulation in Brazil is that financial innovations in Brazil are
more frequent, as the market is in a less mature state. However, of the 12 changes
in the regulation over the 2 years ending in 2006, only 2 of them comprised changes
to the list of liabilities included in the reservable base.
Table 3 compares reserve requirement regulation on transactions accounts in
the United States and in Brazil, as of December 2006. There were important differences
not only regarding the ratios, but also the form of compliance, calculation and
maintenance periods, and minimum required daily balances. More generally, these
ratios are still significantly high under international comparisons (Figure 4).
Figure 4. Ratios of reserve requirement on transaction accounts in selected
emerging markets and developed countries (as of 2004)73 THE INCIDENCE OF RESERVE REQUIREMENTS IN BRAZIL
III. Event study
Most of the literature that tests the impact of changes in reserve requirements on
stock returns has employed the one-factor model derived from CAPM.8 Quoting
Brown and Warner (1980), the abnormal return for a given security in any time t is
defined as the difference between its actual ex post return and that which is predicted
under the assumed return-generating process:9
                                                    , with (1)










1 ˆ ˆ b a  . (2)
where ARit = portfolio i’s abnormal return at time t, Rit = portfolio i’s return at time
t, MKTt = benchmark market return at time t, and () i i b a ˆ ˆ = vector of parameters of
the market model estimated for portfolio i using data from the estimation period.
What varies significantly in the literature is the way the parameters  i a ˆ  and  i b ˆ
are estimated. Slovin et al. (1990), and Cosimano and McDonald (1998) add dummies
to the model to capture abnormal returns on the day of the change in reserve
requirements (t = 0), and on the previous day (t = -1), the latter also test for
eventual leaks in policymakers’ intentions. They estimate the parameters through
pooled cross-section time series regressions, using ordinary least squares errors
in the hypothesis tests. Osborne and Zaher (1992), nonetheless, argue that models
using dummies have the drawback of not being able to identify the size of abnormal
returns relative to the size of the tax change. To overcome this problem, they
employ the event-study method, which is widely used in the finance and accounting
literature to identify the impact of certain events on stock returns, and which is
also employed here. Many authors criticize the use of OLS errors to test the
hypothesis of abnormal returns when events are clustered in calendar time, as is
the case in this paper. With clustering of events, the errors estimated through OLS
will present cross-sectional dependence and probably heteroscedasticity, and will
thus jeopardize hypothesis tests if additional techniques are not introduced in the
 8 Brown and Warner (1980) show that multi-factor models or more complicated risk adjustment
models do not yield significant improvements in assessing abnormal returns compared to the
one-factor model.
9 Brown and Warner (1980), p. 207.
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                        USA                     Brazil
Ratios1/ US$ 0 – US$ 7.8 million:  0% R$ 0 – R$ 44 million: 0%
US$ 7.8 million – US$ 48.3 million: 3% More than R$ 44 million: 45%
More than US$ 48.3 million: 10%
Exemptions Institutions with a daily average of net
transactions accounts below
Deductions N/A R$ 44 million from total
reservable deposits
Share of At the discretion of the depository Up to 40% of the reservable
Vault Cash institution, up to the amount of the base
reserve requirement, provided that
reserve balances at the FRB are
non-negative
Reservable 1. Demand Deposits
 Accounts 2. Automatic transfer service accounts
3. NOW accounts
4. Share draft accounts
5. Telephone or preauthorized transfer
    accounts
6. Ineligible acceptances
7. Obligations issued by affiliates
    maturing  in 7 days or less
Table 3. Regulation on reserve requirements on transaction accounts in the
United States and in Brazil, as of December 2006
1. Demand Deposits
2. Prior notice deposits
3. Share draft accounts
4. Deposits from tax levied
5. Business cheques
6. Deposits from services
supplied
7. Deposits from realized
guaranties
8. Investment deposits




1. Institutions with a daily
average of reservable
US$ 7.8 billion deposits below
R$ 44,000,010 thousand
2. Deposits from payment
orders in foreign currencies







4. Demand, prior notice and
investment deposits of city
governments with their
respective state-controlled
banks75 THE INCIDENCE OF RESERVE REQUIREMENTS IN BRAZIL
Total Required US$ 41.05 billion (as of August 2006)
Reserves
Depository Commercial banks, savings banks and Universal banks with a
Institutions loan associations, credit unions, commercial portfolio,
US branches and agencies of foreign commercial banks, investment
banks, Edge act corporations, banks, savings banks
and agreement corporations
Calculation For institutions that file reports on a 2 weeks
Period weekly basis: 2 weeks
For institutions that submit reports on 1 week
a quarterly basis2/:
Maintenance For institutions that file reports on a
Period weekly basis: 2 weeks, beginning
17 days after the end of the
associated calculation period
For institutions that submit reports on 2 weeks, overlapping with the
a quarterly basis: 13 consecutive last week of the calculation
1-week periods, beginning 24 days period
after the end of the calculation period
Minimum daily 0%, provided that the reserve 80% of the reservable base,
balances in the requirement is met on average over and provided that the reserve
maintenance the maintenance period requirement is met on average
period over the maintenance period
Table 3. Regulation on reserve requirements on transaction accounts in the
United States and in Brazil, as of December 2006
                           USA                                               Brazil
Notes: 1/ Bound values refer to daily averages of reservable deposits. For the US, net
deposits correspond to total deposits less amounts due from other depository institutions
and less cash items in the process of collection. In Brazil, cash items in the process of
collection are also deducted from the reservable base. 2/ These institutions are usually the
ones with a low record of transactions deposits. More accurately, the FRB clarifies that an
institution with net transaction accounts greater than the exemption amount for either of the
two weeks and with total deposits less than the nonexempt deposit cutoff for both weeks
will continue to submit the FR 2900 on a quarterly basis. An institution with net transaction
accounts less than or equal to the exemption amount for both of the two report weeks and
with total deposits less than the reduced reporting limit for both of the report weeks will no
longer be required to submit the FR 2900. Source: FRB and Central Bank of Brazil
(www.bcb.gov.br). JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS 76
estimation. Brown and Warner (1980, 1985) suggest that aggregate measures of
stock performance be used instead of individual portfolio returns to overcome the
problem of cross-sectional correlation.
Our null hypothesis is of no abnormal returns over the event period (the period
when the event may be affecting stock returns). To test the null we employed two
alternative test procedures, based on Dann and James (1982) and Dodd and Warner
(1983). To apply Dann and James’ T-test statistics, we averaged the stock returns
of companies listed in Bovespa, the most important Brazilian stock exchange, over
two groups: financial and non-financial, weighing each company’s return by its
daily financial volume of transactions. We then ran OLS on each of the two groups
of companies over the estimation period (when the event was likely not affecting
the return generating process) to obtain the parameters in (2). We would then
identify the size of the abnormal return in (1) by comparing the result we obtained
in (2) with the actual average stock returns in each group over the event period.
The T-statistic for each day in the event window is defined as:
                      , (3)
where       , p = industry (in this study
financial or non-financial), Lp = number of days in the estimation period, Sp
2=
variance of the market-model residuals for industry p (calculated over the estimation
period), MKTt = return of the benchmark portfolio at time t in the event window,
MKTt = return of the benchmark portfolio at time  t in the estimation period, MKT
= average return of the benchmark portfolio over the estimation period. As cross-
section correlation and heteroscedasticity were properly treated, market model
residuals are independent and identically distributed. Therefore, the T-statistic is
distributed as two-tailed Student-t with (Lp-2) degrees of freedom.
To test for the significance of cumulative abnormal returns over a sub-period
(I) of the event window, or even over the entire event window itself (A), the first
method employed was to calculate the T2 statistics:
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p p k SCAR Z =
, (4)
where n = number of days in the impact period (I), defined as a sub-period within
the event window, N = number of days in the event window, AR = average abnormal
return calculated over the subset of the event window that does not include the
impact period. Under the null of no abnormal returns, the T2 statistics is distributed
as a two-tailed t-Student with N-n-1 degrees of freedom.
The alternative method to the T2 statistics used in this study is Dodd and




We thus calculate the standarized cumulative abnormal return for each firm i:











 and kp is the number of firms in industry p. Under
the null of no abnormal standardized returns, Z is distributed as a standard normal.
, (6)
, (7) JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS 78
IV. The sample and the events
The sample consisted of ordinary (voting) shares negotiated at Bovespa. The
series was obtained from Economatica®, and was adjusted for dividends, splits,
and grouping. However, following Mandelker (1974), Watts (1978), Asquith and
Mullins (1986), and Osborne and Zaher (1992), we removed from our sample those
companies that distributed or announced dividends, stock dividends, capital gains,
splits, grouping, new stock offers, unresolved ownership disputes, mergers,
buyouts, and acquisitions during the estimation period and event window. There
is a problem that remains when this procedure is implemented, and to our knowledge
it is not explicitly addressed in the literature investigated.10 The benchmark market
index does not exclude companies that may be under the effect of such events.
Thus, in some occasions their abnormal returns may influence the test-result and
imply that the industry analyzed is showing abnormal returns when in fact it is the
market index that is abnormal. Such an issue seemed to play a role in one of the
events analyzed below. We shall address it then.
Mergers and acquisitions were a serious problem in the Brazilian sample. During
the entire period analyzed in this paper, financial institutions went through
significant changes in ownership, not only due to the privatization program of
state and federal banks, but also due to a fierce competition for higher stakes of the
domestic market. In the non-financial sector many industries also went through
similar processes of ownership transfers, but to a lesser extent.
Seven events of reserve requirement changes were analyzed. As shown in
Table 4, events 1 to 4 refer to changes in reserve requirements on time deposits,
and the three remaining events refer to changes in reserve requirements on
transaction accounts. Table 4 also shows the non-event (estimation) period used
for each event.
The estimation period selected for each event was the largest possible, given
the number of changes in reserve requirements that occurred during the analyzed
period. The selected events had their estimation window free of any possible
influence from other reserve requirement changes. This is the reason why we
selected so few events, compared to the universe of reserve requirement changes
that have occurred since 1994.
For events 1 and 3, the estimation period spans a period prior to the event
window. For events 4 to 7, we used a post-event estimation period because the
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period before the event had important economic announcements that could
adversely impact the estimation of the market model. Distinctly from the other
events, the estimation period of the second event was split in two. The number of
days that could be used for the estimation period either before or after the event
window was too small to allow for reasonable econometric inference. To prevent
the event dynamics from having any impact on the estimation period, we left a
span of 7 working days (12 week days) between the end of the event window and
the beginning of that subset of the estimation window. The use of pre- and
postevent estimation periods is not an innovation here (see, e.g., Osborne and
Zaher 1992). Under the assumption that the event will only affect the stock return
dynamics in the event period, the econometrician can choose pre-event, postevent
or a mix of both for the estimation period.
For daily T-tests and the Z-tests, the event window tested here consisted of 6
business days (D-2 to D+3). D0 was either the announcement date, when it was
made with the markets still open, or the business day that immediately followed the
announcement, when it was made after markets had closed. For more robustness
in the analysis, we let the event window be comprised of either 5 or 11 business
days for cumulative T-tests. As the results for these two alternative event periods
are very similar, Tables 6 and 7 report only the 5-day period. Specifically for event
4, the event window tested consisted of either 6 or 8 business days. The choice of
the length of the event period is ad-hoc in the literature. In the literature that
employs event-methods to detect abnormal returns from changes in reserve
requirements in the United States, for instance, Dann and James (1982) and Kolari
et al. (1988) use a 26-business day event period whereas Osborne and Zaher (1992)
use an 11-day window. A rule of thumb is that the event period should not be too
short to let out eventual price corrections or too lengthy to be contaminated by
normal price dynamics or other innovation. A lengthy period would be more
problematic in the Brazilian case because of the high frequency of news that
impact stock returns in the country, both at a macro level, affecting all listed
companies alike, and at more micro levels, affecting only a subgroup of listed
companies.
There are two representative benchmark rates that can be used in Brazil:
Ibovespa and IbrX. Both are traded in Bovespa, the main stock exchange in
Brazil, but significantly differ as to their calculation methodologies. Ibovespa’s
theoretical portfolio dates from 1968 and accounts for around 80% of the amount
and financial volume traded in the spot market. IbrX, on the other hand, comprises81 THE INCIDENCE OF RESERVE REQUIREMENTS IN BRAZIL
the 100 stocks with the greatest number of negotiations and financial volume
traded.
V. The results
Table 5 shows the results of the market model estimation and the tests for abnormal
returns using Dann and James (1982)’s T-tests and Dodd and Warner (1983)’s
Ztest. As the market model estimations using IBrX had a better performance (Table
A1 in Appendix), we chose to test for abnormal returns using the IBrX as the proxy
for the market return.
For each event we tested the null hypothesis of no abnormal returns in the
event period. We will first analyze each event separately and then draw general
conclusions.
In event 1, the central bank changed the regulation on reserve requirements on
time deposits by requiring banks to comply with the requirement by investing in
federal securities. The regulation that was previously in place required banks to
deposit reserves at the central bank, accruing the TBC interest rate, which was
lower than the rates accrued to federal securities. Thus, this change in reserve
requirement regulation would be expected to cause net positive abnormal returns
to the banking industry and/or to the non-financial system over the event window.
However, two days prior to the announcement, there were significant negative
abnormal returns in banks’ stocks. On that specific day, there is no evidence in the
newswires of any false rumor about a change in reserve requirements. Thus,
negative abnormal returns in the banking industry are likely to have occurred
because of a temporary overreaction of the benchmark market return stemming
from a previous successful auctioning of a domestic energy generation firm
(Gerasul).
The tests for cumulative abnormal returns over the entire event period are
sensitive to the methodology employed. Using Dann and James (1982)’s twotailed
T-test statistics, we found no evidence of cumulative abnormal returns in the
stocks of the financial or non-financial system. Notwithstanding, Dodd and Warner
(1983)’s Z-test points to significant cumulative negative abnormal returns to the
banking industry even at the 99% confidence level. There is an important
methodological difference between these two test alternatives. Whilst the T-test
for cumulative abnormal returns uses a stock return series that is weighted by the
daily traded financial volume, the Z-test is equally weighted. Therefore, significant JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS 82
abnormal returns of stocks that are less liquid will be attributed greater importance
by the Z-test than by the T-test.
The Z-test result for the banking industry is probably capturing not only the
exaggeration in the benchmark market index on the first day of the event period but
also a negative reaction on the last day caused by some news that Standard and
Poor’s had lowered the outlook for the external debt of the country and of 3
privately-owned banks, amongst which was Unibanco, included in the sample
analyzed in the event.
The T-test, on the other hand, is highly influenced by the neutrality of the
event in the stock returns of Banco do Brasil, the bank by far with the highest
financial volume traded over the event. This neutrality is ambiguous, though. One
could reason that if it had not been for the positive news about the reserve
requirements, the turmoil surrounding the domestic economy (e.g., capital flight,
increased interest rates, debt downgrading) would have caused important negative
abnormal returns to the stocks of Banco do Brasil. As we do not know of a way to
solve this issue, we take the more conservative stance of interpreting the results
as suggesting that this change in reserve requirement regulation was neutral to
the banking industry.
In the non-financial system, the Z-test indicates significant cumulative positive
abnormal returns. The presence of stocks of non-financial firms (albeit not the
most liquid ones) being positively affected by this change in required reserves on
time deposits can thus suggest that the change was interpreted as a relief of the tax
burden imposed to the non-financial system.
In events 2, 3 and 4, the central bank reduced the ratios of reserve requirements
on time deposits. Although the absolute reduction was most pronounced in the
last events, abnormal returns in the financial system were only observed in event
2. The T-tests for daily abnormal returns indicate positive abnormal returns in bank
stocks on the day prior to the announcement and on the three days following the
announcement. The Z-test result for cumulative abnormal returns in the banking
industry is also in line with the daily T-tests, and suggests a significant positive
abnormal return to bank shareholders in the event period.
The evidence of abnormal returns to the banking industry only in event 2
suggests that banks’ shareholders may have anticipated the future downward
trajectory of required ratios, as the central bank had previously announced that
reduction of reserve requirements was a medium term goal.
That may also have been the case for the non-financial system. Although daily
and cumulative T-tests do not support the evidence of abnormal returns in event83 THE INCIDENCE OF RESERVE REQUIREMENTS IN BRAZIL
2, the Z-test rejects the null hypothesis at the 99% confidence level. Once again,
the difference in the test results stems from the distinct weighting methodology of
each test.
We should thus interpret these results as supporting the evidence that for
corporate stocks that are not highly liquid, reserve requirements on time deposits
are a tax shared amongst banks’ clients and owners. These conclusions contrast
with those in Cardoso and Koyama (1999). Our view is that, in spite of yielding
market returns on securities, the fact that reserve requirements on time deposits
require banks to allocate their portfolio in a certain class of investment may be in
itself distortional. It may also be misleading to assume that these types of reserve
requirements do not impose any kind of burden to the real sector.
We now turn to changes in reserve requirements on transaction accounts in
Table 6. Event 5, which reduced the required ratio by 10 percentage points, had a
neutral effect on the stock returns of the non-financial system. This evidence
holds for both T- and Z- tests. On the other hand, although daily T-tests and the
cumulative Z-test did not point to significant abnormal bank stock returns,
cumulative T-tests strongly reject the null for both the sub-period following the
announcement and for the entire event period. We thus interpret these results as
suggesting that banks whose stocks were highly traded during the event period
were significantly more impacted by these changes in reserve requirements than
those with low negotiation volumes. Under this reasoning, required reserves on
transaction accounts would be interpreted as a tax born upon banks’ shareholders,
and not clients.
Event 6, which exempted one liability account from the taxable base, had a
significant impact on bank stock returns two days prior to the announcement.
However, this impact was offset throughout the event period, and both cumulative
T- and Z-tests could not reject the null hypothesis of no abnormal return.
The daily and cumulative T-tests do not indicate presence of abnormal returns
in the non-financial sector. On the other hand, the Z-test points to counter-intuitive
negative cumulative abnormal returns in the event period (at a 90% confidence
level). Traded volume in the stock exchange was very low over the event period
due to uncertainty stemming from the international environment and negative
news from major foreign stock exchanges. We thus take the conservative stance of
accepting the results of the T-tests as indicative that this change in the reserve
requirement regulation had a neutral impact on both the banking and the











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































485 THE INCIDENCE OF RESERVE REQUIREMENTS IN BRAZIL
In event 7, the central bank increased the reserve requirement ratio and also
increased deductions from the taxable base. Contrary to the events analyzed above,
this change was justified purely as a monetary policy decision. However, the event
was contaminated by a concomitant central bank decision to increase basic interest
rates. Although we cannot conclude that evidence of abnormal returns during this
event would be solely or even partially due to the change in reserve requirements,
it should be interesting to check whether the use of two instruments together to
further restrict monetary conditions would cause negative abnormal returns in the
stocks of the non-financial sector.
In the non-financial sector, the event induced negative abnormal returns
on the day following the announcement. Cumulative T-tests also point to
negative abnormal returns over the sub-period after the announcement and
over the entire event period. However, and surprisingly, the Z-test points to
positive abnormal returns over the event period. In this particular event, we find
that the T-tests are to be more trusted than the Z-test for the non-banking sector.
On the second day of the event, a particular firm stock (Telebras Remanescente
ON) posted a 100% daily return, partially offset the following day, but with negligible
traded volume.
On the other hand, the Z-test for the banking industry points to negative
abnormal returns over the event period, whereas the daily and cumulative T-tests
present no evidence of abnormal returns. This time, the banks more severely affected
by the event were the ones whose stocks had lower financial negotiation.
Looking at these results, we conclude that reserve requirements on transaction
accounts in Brazil were not a tax born exclusively by banks’ clients. From the
events that were not contaminated by concomitant monetary policy decision, we
further infer that they are a tax born solely by banks’ shareholders, and thus not
operative for the credit channel of monetary policy. This latter conclusion should
be taken with caution, as it is derived from two events only. We advise that in the
future more events be analyzed to draw more robust conclusions.
Our findings are in line with most papers that investigate the incidence of
reserve requirements using event-study methods. Kolari et al. (1998), Slovin et al.
(1990), Osborne and Zaher (1992), Cosimano and McDonald (1998), and Hein and
Stewart (2002, 2003) all find that reserve requirements are a tax shared by banks’
shareholders and clients in the US. Slovin et al. (1990) go on further to argue that
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VI. Conclusion
In this paper we tested the hypothesis of shared incidence of reserve requirements
in Brazil. By employing an event-study method, we investigated whether changes
in reserve requirements on transaction accounts and time deposits caused abnormal
stock returns in the financial and non-financial sector of the economy.
The results obtained are sensitive to the test procedure adopted, implying that
the conclusions should be taken with caution. What is reported below is based on
a discretionary choice by the authors of taking a more conservative stance upon
choosing among conflicting test results.
Some results from the aggregate portfolio model oppose the assumption that
interest bearing required reserves on time deposits are not distortional. In one of
the events investigated, there is evidence that a reduction in required ratios caused
positive abnormal returns to the banking industry. The results also oppose the
assumption that reserve requirements on time deposits are neutral to non-financial
corporations. In spite of yielding market returns on securities, the fact that reserve
requirements on time deposits require banks to allocate their portfolio in a certain
class of investment may be in itself distortional. It may also be misleading to
assume that these types of reserve requirements do not impose any kind of burden
to the real sector. In two events investigated, stock returns of the non-financial
system were positively impacted by announcements that the required ratio would
fall or interest accrued on the required reserves would increase to market rates.
Some authors (e.g., Slovin et al. 1990) advocate that when reserve requirements
affect stock returns of non-financial corporations, then reserve requirements are a
non-neutral instrument of monetary policy. However, when fiscal concerns drive
reserve requirement decisions, as has been the case on a number of occasions in
Brazil, we could extend this argument to state that reserve requirements are a
nonneutral instrument of fiscal policy when stock returns of non-financial firms
are affected by these requirements.
Of the two events that were most likely not contaminated by concomitant
decisions on basic interest rates, changes in reserve requirements on transaction
accounts were neutral to the non-financial sector, implying that if reserve
requirements on transaction accounts were being used to affect the credit channel
of monetary policy, they were inefficient. In one of these events, the banking
industry seems to have benefited from the change, thus suggesting that the tax
implied by these required reserves was most likely born by banks’ shareholders.
Importantly, as banks’ shareholders bear part or (as the events analyzed here JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS 88
suggest) the bulk of the burden of reserve requirements, reductions in their ratios
are likely to be of limited impact in bank spreads. In this respect, this paper adds
support to the work of Nakane and Koyama (2001a,b) and Afanasieff et al. (2002),
where the authors find no significant relation between reserve requirements and
bank spreads on bank loans in Brazil.
Appendix
Table A1. Estimation of the market model for the financial and non-financial
systems using OLS
A. Financial system
Event Data source b t-test p-value R2 F p-value
1 Ibovespa 1.13 6.24 0.00 0.48 39.00 0.00
IBx 1.32 6.90 0.00 0.53 47.65 0.00
2 Ibovespa 1.06 4.10 0.00 0.32 16.80 0.00
IBx 1.23 4.40 0.00 0.35 19.33 0.00
3 Ibovespa 1.07 4.62 0.00 0.43 21.35 0.00
IBx 1.27 5.16 0.00 0.49 26.61 0.00
4 Ibovespa 1.21 4.01 0.00 0.15 16.05 0.00
IBx 1.53 4.53 0.00 0.18 20.51 0.00
5 Ibovespa 0.50 1.83 0.07 0.04 3.35 0.07
IBx 0.61 2.00 0.05 0.04 3.98 0.05
6 Ibovespa 1.12 5.70 0.00 0.41 32.48 0.00
IBx 1.35 5.85 0.00 0.43 34.28 0.00
7 Ibovespa 1.70 3.67 0.00 0.18 17.50 0.00
IBx 1.48 2.05 0.05 0.06 4.19 0.04
B. Non-financial system
Event Data source b t-test p-value R2 F p-value
1 Ibovespa 2.28 14.82 0.00 0.84 219.56 0.00
IBx 2.57 15.60 0.00 0.85 243.39 0.00
2 Ibovespa 1.93 6.38 0.00 0.53 40.72 0.00
IBx 2.18 6.59 0.00 0.55 43.49 0.00
3 Ibovespa 1.74 8.81 0.00 0.73 77.57 0.00
IBx 1.99 9.64 0.00 0.77 92.98 0.00
4 Ibovespa 1.73 6.91 0.00 0.34 47.78 0.00
IBx 2.05 7.29 0.00 0.37 53.15 0.00
5 Ibovespa 1.89 6.51 0.00 0.32 42.43 0.00
IBx 2.16 6.53 0.00 0.32 42.69 0.00
6 Ibovespa 1.55 8.52 0.00 0.61 72.60 0.00
IBx 1.93 9.64 0.00 0.67 92.95 0.00
7 Ibovespa 1.41 7.66 0.00 0.49 58.67 0.00
IBx 2.08 7.75 0.00 0.49 60.11 0.0089 THE INCIDENCE OF RESERVE REQUIREMENTS IN BRAZIL
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